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# Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot

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< Unified Extensible Firmware Interface

Related articles

- Arch boot process
- Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
- Security

Secure Boot is a security feature found in the UEFI standard, designed to add a layer of protection to the pre-boot process: by maintaining a cryptographically signed list of binaries authorized or forbidden to run at boot, it helps in improving the confidence that the machine core boot components (boot manager, kernel, initramfs) have not been tampered with.

As such it can be seen as a continuation or complement to the efforts in securing one's computing environment, reducing the attack surface that other software security solutions such as system encryption cannot easily cover, while being totally distinct and not dependent on them. Secure Boot just stands on its own as a component of current security practices, with its own set of pros and cons.

Note: For a deeper overview about Secure Boot in Linux, see Rodsbooks' Secure Boot article and other online resources. This article focuses on how to set up Secure Boot in Arch Linux.

## Checking Secure Boot status

### Before booting the OS

At this point, one has to look at the firmware setup. If the machine was booted and is running, in most cases it will have to be rebooted.

You may access the firmware configuration by pressing a special key during the boot process. The key to use depends on the firmware. It is usually one of `Esc`, `F2`, `Del` or possibly another `Fn` key. Sometimes the right key is displayed for a short while at the beginning of the boot process. The motherboard manual usually records it. You might want to press the key, and keep pressing it, immediately following powering on the machine, even before the screen actually displays anything.

After entering the firmware setup, be careful not to change any settings without prior intention. Usually there are navigation instructions, and short help for the settings, at the bottom of each setup screen. The setup itself might be composed of several pages. You will have to navigate to the correct place. The interesting setting might be simply denoted by secure boot, which can be set on or off.

### After booting the OS

An easy way to check Secure Boot status on systems using systemd is to use systemd-boot:

Note: There is no need to be using systemd-boot as your boot manager for this command to work, it is more akin to the other *ctl systemd utilities (localectl, timedatectl...) and will not touch your configuration.

    $ bootctl

    System:
          Firmware: UEFI 2.80 (American Megatrends 5.26)
     Firmware Arch: x64
       Secure Boot: enabled (user)
      TPM2 Support: yes
      Measured UKI: yes
      Boot into FW: supported
    ...

Here we see that Secure Boot is enabled and enforced (in user mode); other values are `disabled (setup)` for Setup Mode, `disabled (disabled)` if Secure Boot is disabled and `disabled (unsupported)` if the firmware does not feature Secure Boot.

Another way to check whether the machine was booted with Secure Boot is to use this command:

    $ od --address-radix=n --format=u1 /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c

If Secure Boot is enabled, this command returns `1` as the final integer in a list of five, for example:

    6  0  0  0  1

Note, however, that the kernel may be unaware of Secure Boot (even if it is enabled in the firmware) if an insufficiently capable boot loader is used. This can be verified by checking the kernel messages shortly after the system starts up:

    # dmesg | grep -i secure

    [    0.013442] Secure boot disabled
    [    0.013442] Secure boot could not be determined

The kernel messages will otherwise read `Secure boot enabled`.

## Booting an installation medium

The official installation image does not support Secure Boot (FS#53864). Secure Boot support was initially added in `archlinux-2013.07.01-dual.iso` and later removed in `archlinux-2016.06.01-dual.iso`. At that time prebootloader was replaced with efitools, even though the latter uses unsigned EFI binaries. There has been no support for Secure Boot in the official installation medium ever since.

In order to boot an installation medium in a Secure Boot system, you will need to either disable Secure Boot or modify the image in order to add a signed boot loader.

Archboot images provide a way to use secure boot on installation media.

### Disabling Secure Boot

The Secure Boot feature can be disabled via the UEFI firmware interface. How to access the firmware configuration is described in #Before booting the OS.

If using a hotkey did not work and you can boot Windows, you can force a reboot into the firmware configuration in the following way (for Windows 10): Settings > Update & Security > Recovery > Advanced startup (Restart now) > Troubleshoot > Advanced options > UEFI Firmware settings > restart.

Note that some motherboards (this is the case in a Packard Bell laptop and recent Xiaomi laptops) only allow to disable secure boot if you have set an administrator password (that can be removed afterwards). See also Rod Smith's Disabling Secure Boot.

### Repacking the installation image

See #ISO repacking.

### Editing the installation medium

If you are using a USB flash installation medium, then it is possible to manually edit the EFI system partition on the medium to add support for Secure Boot.

Plug in the USB drive, then mount the partition:

    # mount /dev/disk/by-label/ARCHISO_EFI /mnt

Then follow the instructions in #Using a signed boot loader to install any signed boot loader. For example, to install #PreLoader:

    # mv /mnt/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI /mnt/EFI/BOOT/loader.efi
    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/PreLoader.efi /mnt/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI
    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/HashTool.efi /mnt/EFI/BOOT/HashTool.efi

## Implementing Secure Boot

There are certain conditions making for an ideal setup of Secure boot:

1. UEFI considered mostly trusted (despite having some well known criticisms and vulnerabilities[1]) and necessarily protected by a strong password
2. Default manufacturer/third party keys are not in use, as they have been shown to weaken the security model of Secure Boot by a great margin[2]
3. UEFI directly loads a user-signed EFI boot stub-compatible unified kernel image (no boot manager), including microcode (if applicable) and initramfs so as to maintain throughout the boot process the chain of trust established by Secure Boot and reduce the attack surface
4. Use of full drive encryption, so that the tools and files involved in the kernel image creation and signing process cannot be accessed and tampered with by someone having physical access to the machine.
5. Some further improvements may be obtained by using a TPM.

A simple and fully self-reliant setup is described in #Using your own keys, while #Using a signed boot loader makes use of intermediate tools signed by a third-party.

Using the GRUB bootloader requires extra steps before enabling secure boot, see GRUB#Secure Boot support for details.

### Using your own keys

Warning: Replacing the platform keys with your own can end up bricking hardware on some machines, including laptops, making it impossible to get into the firmware settings to rectify the situation. This is due to the fact that some device (e.g GPU) firmware (OpROMs), that get executed during boot, are signed using Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate or vendor certificates. This is the case in many Lenovo Thinkpad X, P and T series laptops which uses the Lenovo CA certificate to sign UEFI applications and firmware.

Secure Boot implementations use these keys:

Platform Key (PK)
  Top-level key.
Key Exchange Key (KEK)
  Keys used to sign Signatures Database and Forbidden Signatures Database updates.
Signature Database (db)
  Contains keys and/or hashes of allowed EFI binaries.
Forbidden Signatures Database (dbx)
  Contains keys and/or hashes of denylisted EFI binaries.

See The Meaning of all the UEFI Keys for a more detailed explanation.

To use Secure Boot you need at least PK, KEK and db keys. While you can add multiple KEK, db and dbx certificates, only one Platform Key is allowed.

Once Secure Boot is in "User Mode" keys can only be updated by signing the update (using sign-efi-sig-list) with a higher level key. Platform key can be signed by itself.

#### Backing up current variables

Before creating new keys and modifying EFI variables, it is advisable to backup the current variables, so that they may be restored in case of error.

Install the efitools package, then run the following commands to backup all four of the principal Secure Boot variables:

    $ for var in PK KEK db dbx ; do efi-readvar -v $var -o old_${var}.esl ; done

If you perform this command on a new computer or motherboard, the variables you extract will most likely be the ones provided by Microsoft.

#### Putting firmware in "Setup Mode"

Secure Boot is in Setup Mode when the Platform Key is removed. To put firmware in Setup Mode, enter firmware setup utility and find an option to delete or clear certificates. How to enter the setup utility is described in #Before booting the OS.

#### Assisted process with systemd

As of v257, you can easily set up Secure Boot with systemd and systemd-boot. Install systemd-ukify and sbsigntools.

First generate your signing keys with e.g.:

    # ukify genkey \
    --secureboot-private-key /etc/kernel/secure-boot-private-key.pem \
    --secureboot-certificate /etc/kernel/secure-boot-certificate.pem

Tip: Alternatively, set up your desired configuration in `/etc/kernel/uki.conf` (or use the template from `/usr/lib/kernel/uki.conf`) and use ukify's `--config` option. This is useful to automatically reuse the keys to sign UKIs later with kernel-install.

Next, configure the ESP for auto-enrollment:

    # bootctl install --secure-boot-auto-enroll yes \
    --certificate /etc/kernel/secure-boot-certificate.pem \
    --private-key /etc/kernel/secure-boot-private-key.pem

This will create the three files `PK.auth`, `KEK.auth` and `db.auth` in `/boot/loader/keys/auto/`. Note that this command also installs (or updates) the systemd-boot bootloader to the ESP.

Finally, set `secure-boot-enroll=force` in `/boot/loader.conf`. See loader.conf(5).

#### Assisted process with sbctl

sbctl is a user-friendly way of setting up secure boot and signing files.

Note: sbctl does not work with all hardware. How well it will work depends on the manufacturer.

To use it, install sbctl. See also the upstream README and sbctl(8).

##### Creating and enrolling keys

Before starting, go to your firmware settings and set secure boot mode to Setup mode. This is different for each device: see sbctl(8) § USAGE.

Once you log back in, check the secure boot status:

    $ sbctl status

You should see that sbctl is not installed and secure boot is disabled.

Then create your custom secure boot keys:

    # sbctl create-keys

Enroll your keys, with Microsoft's keys, to the UEFI:

    # sbctl enroll-keys -m

Warning: Some firmware is signed and verified with Microsoft's keys when secure boot is enabled. Not validating devices could brick them. To enroll your keys without enrolling Microsoft's, run: `sbctl enroll-keys`. Only do this if you know what you are doing.

Check the secure boot status again:

    $ sbctl status

sbctl should be installed now, but secure boot will not work until the boot files have been signed with the keys you just created.

##### Signing

Check what files need to be signed for secure boot to work:

    # sbctl verify

Now sign all the unsigned files. Usually the kernel and the boot loader need to be signed. For example:

    # sbctl sign -s /boot/vmlinuz-linux
    # sbctl sign -s /boot/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI

The files that need to be signed will depend on your system's layout, kernel and boot loader.

Tip: Especially if you are dual-booting with Windows, there may be a lot of files that need to be signed. The process of signing all needed files using sbctl can be done with sed:

    # sbctl verify | sed 's/✗ /sbctl sign -s /e'

This example assumes that the outputted file paths are relative to `/boot`. Alternatively, you can use:

    # sbctl verify | sed -E 's|^.* (/.+) is not signed$|sbctl sign -s "\1"|e'

This is agnostic of the filepath, and doesn't need the '✗' character.

Now you are done! Reboot your system and turn secure boot back on in the firmware settings. If the boot loader and OS load, secure boot should be working. Check with:

    $ sbctl status

##### Automatic signing with the pacman hook

sbctl comes with a pacman hook that automatically signs all new files whenever the Linux kernel, systemd or the boot loader is updated.

Tip: If you use Systemd-boot and `systemd-boot-update.service`, the boot loader is only updated after a reboot, and the sbctl pacman hook will therefore not sign the new file. As a workaround, it can be useful to sign the boot loader directly in `/usr/lib/`, as `bootctl install` and `update` will automatically recognize and copy .efi.signed files to the ESP if present, instead of the normal .efi file. See bootctl(1).

    # sbctl sign -s -o /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/systemd-bootx64.efi.signed /usr/lib/systemd/boot/efi/systemd-bootx64.efi

#### Manual process

##### Install efitools

Nearly all of the following sections require you to install the efitools package.

##### Creating keys

To generate keys, perform the following steps.

You will need private keys and certificates in multiple formats:

.key
  PEM format private keys for EFI binary and EFI signature list signing.
.crt
  PEM format certificates for sbsign(1), sbvarsign(1) and sign-efi-sig-list(1).
.cer
  DER format certificates for firmware.
.esl
  Certificates in an EFI Signature List for sbvarsign(1), efi-updatevar(1), KeyTool and firmware.
.auth
  Certificates in an EFI Signature List with an authentication header (i.e. a signed certificate update file) for efi-updatevar(1), sbkeysync, KeyTool and firmware.

Create a GUID for owner identification:

    $ uuidgen --random > GUID.txt

Platform key:

    $ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout PK.key -new -x509 -sha256 -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Platform Key/" -out PK.crt
    $ openssl x509 -outform DER -in PK.crt -out PK.cer
    $ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" PK.crt PK.esl
    $ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k PK.key -c PK.crt PK PK.esl PK.auth

Sign an empty file to allow removing Platform Key when in "User Mode":

    $ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -c PK.crt -k PK.key PK /dev/null noPK.auth

Key Exchange Key:

    $ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout KEK.key -new -x509 -sha256 -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Key Exchange Key/" -out KEK.crt
    $ openssl x509 -outform DER -in KEK.crt -out KEK.cer
    $ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" KEK.crt KEK.esl
    $ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k PK.key -c PK.crt KEK KEK.esl KEK.auth

Signature Database key:

    $ openssl req -newkey rsa:4096 -nodes -keyout db.key -new -x509 -sha256 -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Signature Database key/" -out db.crt
    $ openssl x509 -outform DER -in db.crt -out db.cer
    $ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" db.crt db.esl
    $ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db db.esl db.auth

###### Helper script

A helper/convenience script is offered by the author of the reference page on this topic[3] (requires python). A mildly edited version is also packaged as sbkeysAUR.

In order to use it, simply create a folder in a secure location (e.g. `/etc/efi-keys/` if later use of sbupdate-gitAUR to automate unified kernel image creation and signing is planned) and run it:

    # mkdir /etc/efi-keys
    # cd !$
    # curl -L -O https://www.rodsbooks.com/efi-bootloaders/mkkeys.sh
    # chmod +x mkkeys.sh
    # ./mkkeys.sh
    Enter a Common Name to embed in the keys, e.g. "Secure Boot"

This will produce the required files in different formats.

##### Enrolling keys in firmware

Use one of the following methods to enroll db, KEK and PK certificates.

Tip: As the dbx (forbidden signatures db) is empty, it can be safely left out in the following instructions.
Warning: Enrolling Platform Key sets Secure Boot in "User Mode", leaving "Setup Mode", so it should be enrolled last in sequence.

###### Using sbkeysync

Install sbsigntools. Create a directory `/etc/secureboot/keys` with the following directory structure -

    /etc/secureboot/keys
    ├── db
    ├── dbx
    ├── KEK
    └── PK

For example using:

    # mkdir -p /etc/secureboot/keys/{db,dbx,KEK,PK}

Then copy each of the .auth files that were generated earlier into their respective locations (for example, `PK.auth` into `/etc/secureboot/keys/PK` and so on).

If you want to verify the changes `sbkeysync` will make to the system's UEFI keystore, use:

    # sbkeysync --keystore /etc/secureboot/keys --pk --dry-run --verbose

Finally, use `sbkeysync` to enroll your keys.

    # sbkeysync --keystore /etc/secureboot/keys --verbose
    # sbkeysync --keystore /etc/secureboot/keys --verbose --pk

Tip:

- If `sbkeysync` returns write errors, first run `chattr -i /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/{PK,KEK,db}*` prior to issuing commands with `sbkeysync` to temporarily change file attributes, enabling writing of the EFI keys within the `efivars` directory. See chattr(1).
- If you get a `permission denied` error for `PK.auth`, you can enroll it with command `efi-updatevar -f /etc/secureboot/keys/PK/PK.auth PK`.
- If this fails, it might be due to the firmware locking BIOS settings. On Dell & Lenovo systems, you may need to reset the BIOS password: Sysfs Firmware Authentication Documentation

On Lenovo systems:

    # cat > /sys/class/firmware-attributes/thinklmi/authentication/Admin/current_password
    my-super-secret-password
    ^D

On Dell systems:

    # cat > /sys/class/firmware-attributes/dell-wmi-sysman/authentication/Admin/current_password
    my-super-secret-password
    ^D

and try again.

On next boot the UEFI should be back in User Mode and enforcing Secure Boot policy.

###### Using firmware setup utility

Copy all `*.cer`, `*.esl`, `*.auth` files (except the `noPK.auth` file!) to a FAT formatted file system (you can use EFI system partition).

Warning: Do not copy the `noPK.auth` file to the EFI system partition (ESP) of your PC! If you do this, and someone e.g. steals your PC, this person can delete the personal Platform Key in the UEFI Secure Boot firmware again, turn on "Setup Mode" on your PC again and replace your Secure Boot Keys (PK, KEK, db, dbx) with their own Platform Key, thereby defeating the whole purpose of UEFI Secure Boot. Only you should be able to replace the Platform Key, so only you should have access to the `noPK.auth` file. Therefore keep the `noPK.auth` file in a secret, safe place where only you have access to. A safe place for the noPK.auth file are:

- an external USB stick with an EFI system partition when using `KeyTool`. Unfortunately, `KeyTool` can only read files from unencrypted storage.
- encrypted storage on your PC when using `sbkeysync`.

The EFI system partition of your PC must not be encrypted according to the UEFI specifications and can be mounted and read on another PC (if your PC is stolen and if the hard drive is taken out and connected to another PC). Copying the `noPK.auth` file to the ESP of your PC and deleting it afterwards is also not advisable, because deleted files on the FAT32 EFI system partition can be recovered with tools like PhotoRec.

Launch firmware setup utility and enroll db, KEK and PK certificates. Firmwares have various different interfaces, see Replacing Keys Using Your Firmware's Setup Utility for example how to enroll keys.

If the used tool supports it prefer using .auth and .esl over .cer.

###### Using KeyTool

`KeyTool.efi` is in efitools package, copy it to ESP. To use it after enrolling keys, sign it with `sbsign`.

    # sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output esp/KeyTool-signed.efi /usr/share/efitools/efi/KeyTool.efi

Launch `KeyTool-signed.efi` using firmware setup utility, boot loader or UEFI Shell and enroll keys.

See Replacing Keys Using KeyTool for explanation of KeyTool menu options.

###### Using systemd-boot

Since systemd version 252, systemd-boot can be used to enroll keys. To enroll keys, copy the `db.auth`, `KEK.auth` and `PK.auth` to the special folder on the ESP:

    # cp db.auth KEK.auth PK.auth esp/loader/keys/NAME/

Where NAME can be any unique name you assign, such as `MYKEYS`.

After copying the keys and enabling the secure boot setup mode a new entry would appear in the boot menu that would read `Enroll Secure Boot keys: MYKEYS`. Activating this entry would enroll the secure boot keys.

##### Signing EFI binaries

When Secure Boot is active (i.e. in "User Mode"), only signed EFI binaries (e.g. applications, drivers, unified kernel images) can be launched.

###### With sbsigntools

Install sbsigntools to sign EFI binaries with sbsign(1).

Tip:

- To check if a binary is signed and list its signatures use `sbverify --list /path/to/binary`.
- The rEFInd boot manager's `refind-install` script can sign rEFInd EFI binaries and copy them together with the db certificates to the ESP. See rEFInd#Using your own keys for instructions.

Note: If running sbsign without `--output` the resulting file will be `filename.signed`. See sbsign(1) for more information.

To sign your kernel and boot manager use sbsign, e.g.:

    # sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output /boot/vmlinuz-linux /boot/vmlinuz-linux
    # sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output esp/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI esp/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI

Warning: Signing kernel only will not protect the initramfs from tampering. See Unified kernel image to know how to produce a combined image that you can then manually sign with sbsign.

###### Signing the kernel with a mkinitcpio post hook

You can also use a mkinitcpio post hook to sign the kernel when the initramfs gets generated.

Create the following file an make it executable:

    /etc/initcpio/post/kernel-sbsign

    #!/usr/bin/env bash

    kernel="$1"
    [[ -n "$kernel" ]] || exit 0

    # use already installed kernel if it exists
    [[ ! -f "$KERNELDESTINATION" ]] || kernel="$KERNELDESTINATION"

    keypairs=(/path/to/db.key /path/to/db.crt)

    for (( i=0; i<${#keypairs[@]}; i+=2 )); do
        key="${keypairs[$i]}" cert="${keypairs[(( i + 1 ))]}"
        if ! sbverify --cert "$cert" "$kernel" &>/dev/null; then
            sbsign --key "$key" --cert "$cert" --output "$kernel" "$kernel"
        fi
    done

Replace `/path/to/db.key` and `/path/to/db.crt` with the paths to the key pair you want to use for signing the kernel.

If you are using systemd-boot, there is a dedicated pacman hook doing this task semi-automatically.

###### Signing unified kernel images with a mkinitcpio post hook

See Unified kernel image#Signing the UKIs for Secure Boot.

##### Fully automated unified kernel generation and signing with sbupdate

This article or section is out of date.

Reason: sbupdate upstream repository[dead link 2024-07-30 ⓘ] has been archived as of August 2023. Moreover, it was created long before mkinitcpio and other initramfs generators acquired the ability to generate unified kernel images, providing much appreciated ease to this formerly cumbersome process. Nowadays, consider using instead the #Assisted process with sbctl. (Discuss in Talk:Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot)

sbupdate is a tool made specifically to automate unified kernel image generation and signing on Arch Linux. It handles installation, removal and updates of kernels through pacman hooks.

Install sbupdate-gitAUR and configure it following the instructions given on the project's homepage.[4]

Tip: If using systemd-boot, set `OUT_DIR="EFI/Linux"` to get your signed kernel images directly recognized without needing configuration. See systemd-boot(7) § FILES and systemd-boot#Adding loaders.

Once configured, simply run `sbupdate` as root for first-time image generation.

Note: sbupdate output often contains errors such as `warning: data remaining[26413568 vs 26423180]: gaps between PE/COFF sections?`. Those are harmless and can be safely ignored.[5]

#### Updating keys

Once Secure Boot is in "User Mode" any changes to KEK, db and dbx need to be signed with a higher level key.

For example, if you wanted to replace your db key with a new one:

1. Create the new key,
2. Convert it to EFI Signature List,
3. Sign the EFI Signature List,
4. Enroll the signed certificate update file.

    $ cert-to-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" new_db.crt new_db.esl
    $ sign-efi-sig-list -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db new_db.esl new_db.auth

If instead of replacing your db key, you want to add another one to the Signature Database, you need to use the option `-a` (see sign-efi-sig-list(1)):

    $ sign-efi-sig-list -a -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db new_db.esl new_db.auth

When `new_db.auth` is created, enroll it.

#### Dual booting with other operating systems

##### Microsoft Windows

This article or section needs expansion.

Reason: Is it possible to boot Windows by signing its bootloader with a custom key? (Discuss in Talk:Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot#Booting Windows with custom bootloader signature)

It is usually not possible to boot Windows by signing its bootloader (`EFI/Microsoft/Boot/bootmgfw.efi`) with a custom, personal key with Secure Boot Mode enabled, without enrolling the "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" key in the UEFI Secure Boot variables:

- if `bootmgfw.efi` contains a signature both from the "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" and from your own Secure Boot db key (so two signatures), then UEFI firmware implementations like INSYDE Corp. 4096.01 (UEFI Version 2.31, Version F.70, Release Date: 07/18/2016, BIOS Revision 15.112, Firmware Revision: 29.66) will not launch `bootmgfw.efi` and will throw a security violation error (`Selected boot image did not authenticate. Press ENTER to continue.`): UEFI firmware implementation like this can probably only read the first signature - not the second one. Only the certificate for the second signature is enrolled in the UEFI Secure Boot variables, so the Secure Boot verification fails.
- if the "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" signature from the `bootmgfw.efi` file is stripped/removed, and only a signature from your own Secure Boot db key is added to the file, then UEFI will launch the file - but Windows will launch a recovery/repair environment: Windows complains that the Windows installation is broken (because the "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011" signature on `bootmgfw.efi` file is missing).

So to dual boot with Windows,

- you either have to add the hash of `bootmgfw.efi` to the list of allowed hashes in the `db` variable; and you have to update the `db` variable every time a Windows Update changes `bootmgfw.efi`. This is very tedious, error-prone and not supported by Microsoft; and for example BitLocker will not work properly anymore with this setup (BitLocker will ask for your recovery password every time to decrypt your Windows partition).
- or you have to add Microsoft's certificates to the UEFI Secure Boot variables Microsoft has four db certificates and two KEK certificates:
  - The Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate and Windows UEFI CA 2023 must be included in the `db` variable in order to allow the Windows Operating System to load.
  - The Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 certificate and Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 aka the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificates should be included in the `db` variable in order to use third-party binaries like UEFI drivers, option ROMs, shim, etc.
  - The Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 certificate and Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023 should be included in the `KEK` variable, in order to "enable revocation of bad images by updating the `dbx` and potentially for updating `db` to prepare for newer Windows signed images". However, Windows will also boot without them.

Create EFI Signature Lists from Microsoft's DER format `db` certificates using Microsoft's GUID (`77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b`) and combine them in one file for simplicity:

    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_Win_db_2011.esl MicWinProPCA2011_2011-10-19.crt
    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_Win_db_2023.esl 'windows uefi ca 2023.crt'
    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_UEFI_db_2011.esl MicCorUEFCA2011_2011-06-27.crt
    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_UEFI_db_2023.esl 'microsoft uefi ca 2023.crt'
    $ cat MS_Win_db_2011.esl MS_Win_db_2023.esl MS_UEFI_db_2011.esl MS_UEFI_db_2023.esl > MS_db.esl

Optional (for strict conformity with Microsoft UEFI Secure Boot requirements): Create an EFI Signature List from Microsoft's DER format `KEK` certificates using Microsoft's GUID (`77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b`):

    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_Win_KEK_2011.esl MicCorKEKCA2011_2011-06-24.crt
    $ sbsiglist --owner 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b --type x509 --output MS_Win_KEK_2023.esl 'microsoft corporation kek 2k ca 2023.crt'
    $ cat MS_Win_KEK_2011.esl MS_Win_KEK_2023.esl > MS_Win_KEK.esl

Sign a `db` variable update with your `KEK`. Use `sign-efi-sig-list` with option `-a` to add not replace a `db` certificate:

    $ sign-efi-sig-list -a -g 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db MS_db.esl add_MS_db.auth

Optional (for strict conformity with Microsoft UEFI Secure Boot requirements): Sign a `KEK` variable update with your `PK`. Use `sign-efi-sig-list` with option `-a` to add not replace a `KEK` certificate:

    $ sign-efi-sig-list -a -g 77fa9abd-0359-4d32-bd60-28f4e78f784b -k PK.key -c PK.crt KEK MS_Win_KEK.esl add_MS_Win_KEK.auth

Follow #Enrolling keys in firmware to enroll `add_MS_db.auth` and for strict conformity with Microsoft UEFI Secure Boot requirements `add_MS_Win_KEK.auth` into the UEFI Secure Boot Database variables.

### Using a signed boot loader

Using a signed boot loader means using a boot loader signed with Microsoft's key. There are two known signed boot loaders: PreLoader and shim. Their purpose is to chainload other EFI binaries (usually boot loaders). Since Microsoft would never sign a boot loader that automatically launches any unsigned binary, PreLoader and shim use an allowlist called Machine Owner Key list, abbreviated MokList. If the SHA256 hash of the binary (Preloader and shim) or key the binary is signed with (shim) is in the MokList they execute it, if not they launch a key management utility which allows enrolling the hash or key.

Warning: What Microsoft calls "Secured-core PCs" do not ship with Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate (Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 or Microsoft UEFI CA 2023) enrolled.[6]. The only enrolled DB certificate is the Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate which is exclusively used to sign the Windows boot loader.

The enrollment of the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate needs to be enabled in firmware settings to launch EFI binaries and OpROMs signed with this certificate.

#### PreLoader

When run, PreLoader tries to launch `loader.efi`. If the hash of `loader.efi` is not in MokList, PreLoader will launch `HashTool.efi`. In HashTool you must enroll the hash of the EFI binaries you want to launch, that means your boot loader (`loader.efi`) and kernel.

Note: Each time you update any of the binaries (e.g. boot loader or kernel) you will need to enroll their new hash.
Tip: The rEFInd boot manager's `refind-install` script can copy the rEFInd and PreLoader EFI binaries to the ESP. See rEFInd#Using PreLoader for instructions.

##### Set up PreLoader

Note: `PreLoader.efi` and `HashTool.efi` in efitools package are not signed, so their usefulness is limited. You can get a signed `PreLoader.efi` and `HashTool.efi` from preloader-signedAUR or download them manually.

Install preloader-signedAUR and copy `PreLoader.efi` and `HashTool.efi` to the boot loader directory; for systemd-boot use:

    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/{PreLoader,HashTool}.efi esp/EFI/systemd

Now copy over the boot loader binary and rename it to `loader.efi`; for systemd-boot use:

    # cp esp/EFI/systemd/systemd-bootx64.efi esp/EFI/systemd/loader.efi

Finally, create a new NVRAM entry to boot `PreLoader.efi`:

    # efibootmgr --unicode --disk /dev/sdX --part Y --create --label "PreLoader" --loader /EFI/systemd/PreLoader.efi

Replace `X` with the drive letter and replace `Y` with the partition number of the EFI system partition.

This entry should be added to the list as the first to boot; check with the `efibootmgr` command and adjust the boot-order if necessary.

###### Fallback

If there are problems booting the custom NVRAM entry, copy `HashTool.efi` and `loader.efi` to the default loader location booted automatically by UEFI systems:

    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/HashTool.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/
    # cp esp/EFI/systemd/systemd-bootx64.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/loader.efi

Copy over `PreLoader.efi` and rename it:

    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/PreLoader.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI

For particularly intransigent UEFI implementations, copy `PreLoader.efi` to the default loader location used by Windows systems:

    # mkdir -p esp/EFI/Microsoft/Boot
    # cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/PreLoader.efi esp/EFI/Microsoft/Boot/bootmgfw.efi

Note: If dual-booting with Windows, backup the original `bootmgfw.efi` first as replacing it may cause problems with Windows updates.

As before, copy `HashTool.efi` and `loader.efi` to `esp/EFI/Microsoft/Boot/`.

When the system starts with Secure Boot enabled, follow the steps above to enroll `loader.efi` and `/vmlinuz-linux` (or whichever kernel image is being used).

##### How to use while booting?

A message will show up that says `Failed to Start loader... I will now execute HashTool.` To use HashTool for enrolling the hash of `loader.efi` and `vmlinuz.efi`, follow these steps. These steps assume titles for a remastered archiso installation media. The exact titles you will get depends on your boot loader setup.

- Select OK
- In the HashTool main menu, select Enroll Hash, choose `\loader.efi` and confirm with Yes. Again, select Enroll Hash and `archiso` to enter the archiso directory, then select `vmlinuz.efi` and confirm with Yes. Then choose Exit to return to the boot device selection menu.
- In the boot device selection menu choose Arch Linux archiso x86_64 UEFI CD

##### Delete enrolled hash

Every entry of hashes enrolled in the MOK database eats up a little piece of space of NVRAM. You may want to delete useless hashes to free the space and to prevent outdated programs from booting.

Install efitools and copy `KeyTool.efi`:

    # cp /usr/share/efitools/efi/KeyTool.efi esp/EFI/systemd/KeyTool.efi

Manage to boot to Preloader and you will see the KeyTool entry. You can then edit hashes in the MOK database.

##### Remove PreLoader

Note: Since you are going to remove stuff, is a good idea to backup it.

Uninstall preloader-signedAUR and simply remove the copied files and revert configuration; for systemd-boot use:

    # rm esp/EFI/systemd/{PreLoader,HashTool}.efi
    # rm esp/EFI/systemd/loader.efi
    # efibootmgr --unicode --bootnum N --delete-bootnum
    # bootctl update

Where `N` is the NVRAM boot entry created for booting `PreLoader.efi`. Check with the efibootmgr command and adjust the boot-order if necessary.

Note: The above commands cover the easiest case; if you have created, copied, renamed or edited further files probably you have to handle with them, too. If PreLoader was your operational boot entry, you obviously also need to #Disabling Secure Boot.

#### shim

This article or section needs expansion.

Reason: Testing needed. (Discuss in Talk:Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot#shim)

When run, shim tries to launch `grubx64.efi`. If MokList does not contain the hash of `grubx64.efi` or the key it is signed with, shim will launch MokManager (`mmx64.efi`). In MokManager you must enroll the hash of the EFI binaries you want to launch (your boot loader (`grubx64.efi`) and kernel) or enroll the key they are signed with.

Note:

- If you use #shim with hash, each time you update any of the binaries (e.g. boot loader or kernel) you will need to enroll their new hash.
- Since version 15.3, shim will not launch EFI binaries without a valid `.sbat` section. Run `objdump -j .sbat -s /path/to/binary.efi` to verify if an EFI binary has it. See the SBAT documentation for details.
- If you are not actually interested in the security brought by Secure Boot and are only enabling it to meet the requirements posed by Windows 11, you may want to consider disabling the validation process in shim with `mokutil --disable-validation`. In that case you will not need to sign grub (sbat probably still needed) or the kernel images and at the same time be able to boot Windows with `chainloader` in grub.

##### Set up shim

Tip: The rEFInd boot manager's `refind-install` script can sign rEFInd EFI binaries and copy them along with shim and the MOK certificates to the ESP. See rEFInd#Using shim for instructions.

Install shim-signedAUR.

Rename your current boot loader to `grubx64.efi`, because, by default, Shim will try load and run a file named `grubx64.efi`. While this default can be overridden by passing a file path to a different EFI binary as a command line argument to shim, since some firmware have issues with UEFI boot entries that have command line arguments, it is more foolproof to rely on the default.

    # mv esp/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI esp/EFI/BOOT/grubx64.efi

Copy shim and MokManager to your boot loader directory on ESP; use previous filename of your boot loader as as the filename for `shimx64.efi`:

Note: Make sure you do not copy `fbx64.efi` (which is under the same directory) unless you actually have a valid `bootx64.csv` to use. Otherwise shim will not execute `grubx64.efi` but will appear to fail to work and just reset the machine.

    # cp /usr/share/shim-signed/shimx64.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI
    # cp /usr/share/shim-signed/mmx64.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/

Finally, create a new NVRAM entry to boot `BOOTx64.EFI`:

    # efibootmgr --unicode --disk /dev/sdX --part Y --create --label "Shim" --loader /EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI

shim can authenticate binaries by Machine Owner Key or hash stored in MokList.

Machine Owner Key (MOK)
  A key that a user generates and uses to sign EFI binaries.
hash
  A SHA256 hash of an EFI binary.

Using hash is simpler, but each time you update your boot loader or kernel you will need to add their hashes in MokManager. With MOK you only need to add the key once, but you will have to sign the boot loader and kernel each time it updates.

###### shim with hash

If shim does not find the SHA256 hash of `grubx64.efi` in MokList it will launch MokManager (`mmx64.efi`).

In MokManager select Enroll hash from disk, find `grubx64.efi` and add it to MokList. Repeat the steps and add your kernel `vmlinuz-linux`. When done select Continue boot and your boot loader will launch and it will be capable launching the kernel.

###### shim with key

Install sbsigntools.

You will need:

.key
  PEM format private key for EFI binary signing.
.crt
  PEM format certificate for sbsign.
.cer
  DER format certificate for MokManager.

Create a Machine Owner Key:

    $ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout MOK.key -new -x509 -sha256 -days 3650 -subj "/CN=my Machine Owner Key/" -out MOK.crt
    $ openssl x509 -outform DER -in MOK.crt -out MOK.cer

Note: It seems that shim will not support adding a 4096 RSA key to the MokList (it might freeze when loading and verifying the `grubx64.efi` binary), so make sure you use a 2048 key for now. See Debian:SecureBoot#Generating a new key.

Sign your boot loader (named `grubx64.efi`) and kernel:

    # sbsign --key MOK.key --cert MOK.crt --output /boot/vmlinuz-linux /boot/vmlinuz-linux
    # sbsign --key MOK.key --cert MOK.crt --output esp/EFI/BOOT/grubx64.efi esp/EFI/BOOT/grubx64.efi

You will need to do this each time they are updated. You can automate the kernel signing with a mkinitcpio post hook. Create the following file and make it executable:

    /etc/initcpio/post/kernel-sbsign

    #!/usr/bin/env bash

    kernel="$1"
    [[ -n "$kernel" ]] || exit 0

    # use already installed kernel if it exists
    [[ ! -f "$KERNELDESTINATION" ]] || kernel="$KERNELDESTINATION"

    keypairs=(/path/to/MOK.key /path/to/MOK.crt)

    for (( i=0; i<${#keypairs[@]}; i+=2 )); do
        key="${keypairs[$i]}" cert="${keypairs[(( i + 1 ))]}"
        if ! sbverify --cert "$cert" "$kernel" &>/dev/null; then
            sbsign --key "$key" --cert "$cert" --output "$kernel" "$kernel"
        fi
    done

Copy `MOK.cer` to a FAT formatted file system (you can use EFI system partition).

Reboot and enable Secure Boot. If shim does not find the certificate `grubx64.efi` is signed with in MokList it will launch MokManager (`mmx64.efi`).

In MokManager select Enroll key from disk, find `MOK.cer` and add it to MokList. When done select Continue boot and your boot loader will launch and it will be capable launching any binary signed with your Machine Owner Key.

###### shim with key and GRUB

See GRUB#Shim-lock for instructions.

##### Delete enrolled hash/key

Every entry of hash/key enrolled in the MOK database eats up a little piece of space of NVRAM. You may want to delete useless hash/key to free the space and to prevent outdated programs from booting.

MOK database can be managed with mokutil

List enrolled keys & hashes

    # mokutil --list-enrolled

Remove hash from database. The password entered here will be asked for confirmation to delete in MOK manager.

    # mokutil --delete-hash <hash to remove from above command>
    Input password:

Remove key from database

    # mokutil --delete MOK.cer

List hashes/keys to be deleted on next reboot

    # mokutil --list-delete

On next reboot, MOK manager will be initiated with option to Enroll/Delete hashes/keys. More details mokutil(1)

##### Remove shim

Uninstall shim-signedAUR, remove the copied shim and MokManager files and rename back your boot loader.

## Protecting Secure Boot

The only way to prevent anyone with physical access from disabling Secure Boot is to protect the firmware settings with a password. Most UEFI firmwares provide such a feature, usually listed under the "Security" section in the firmware settings.

Consider enabling kernel lockdown mode. See [7].

## Tips and tricks

### ISO repacking

It is possible to unpack and repack the official installation image using libisoburn and mtools. This way, you can create an image that supports Secure Boot, either with custom keys or with a signed boot loader.

This article or section needs expansion.

Reason: Add instructions for repacking the ISO to include shim. (Discuss in Talk:Unified Extensible Firmware Interface/Secure Boot)

#### Sign the official ISO with custom keys

Support for Secure Boot using custom keys can be added to the official ISO by simply extracting the boot loader (`BOOTx64.EFI` and `BOOTIA32.EFI`), kernel, UEFI shell, signing them and then repacking the ISO with the signed files.

First extract the relevant files and El Torito boot images:

    $ osirrox -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-extract_boot_images ./ \
    	-cpx /arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux \
    	/EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI \
    	/EFI/BOOT/BOOTIA32.EFI \
    	/shellx64.efi \
    	/shellia32.efi ./

xorrisofs(1) option `-rational-rock` as used by mkarchiso makes the files on ISO 9660 read-only which persists after extracting them. Make the files writable so that they can be modified:

    $ chmod +w BOOTx64.EFI BOOTIA32.EFI shellx64.efi shellia32.efi vmlinuz-linux

Sign the files. To do so with sbsigntools, for example:

    $ sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output BOOTx64.EFI BOOTx64.EFI
    $ sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output BOOTIA32.EFI BOOTIA32.EFI
    $ sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output shellx64.efi shellx64.efi
    $ sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output shellia32.efi shellia32.efi
    $ sbsign --key db.key --cert db.crt --output vmlinuz-linux vmlinuz-linux

Copy the signed EFI binaries to `eltorito_img2_uefi.img`. It will be used as the EFI system partition and will be listed as an El Torito UEFI boot image. The size of `eltorito_img2_uefi.img` is fixed, but there are 8 MiB free space added by mkarchiso (for the purposes of rounding/alignment, to account for reserved sectors, etc.), so the size increase from the signatures should not be an issue.

    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img vmlinuz-linux ::/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux
    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img BOOTx64.EFI BOOTIA32.EFI ::/EFI/BOOT/
    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img shellx64.efi shellia32.efi ::/

Repack the ISO using the modified El Torito UEFI boot image and add the signed EFI binaries to ISO 9660:

    $ xorriso -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-outdev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64-Secure_Boot.iso \
    	-map vmlinuz-linux /arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux \
    	-map_l ./ /EFI/BOOT/ BOOTx64.EFI BOOTIA32.EFI -- \
    	-map_l ./ / shellx64.efi shellia32.efi -- \
    	-boot_image any replay \
    	-append_partition 2 0xef eltorito_img2_uefi.img

Boot the resulting `archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64-Secure_Boot.iso`.

#### Replacing the boot loader with PreLoader

Another way to add Secure Boot support to the official ISO is by extracting the boot loader and replacing it with #PreLoader.

First, extract the boot loader and the El Torito boot image:

    $ osirrox -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-extract_boot_images ./ \
    	-extract /EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI loader.efi

Replace the `BOOTx64.efi` file with PreLoader:

    $ cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/PreLoader.efi BOOTx64.EFI
    $ cp /usr/share/preloader-signed/HashTool.efi HashTool.efi

Add the new files to the boot image:

    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img BOOTx64.EFI loader.efi HashTool.efi ::/EFI/BOOT/

Finally, repack the ISO using the modified boot image and the new boot loader files:

    $ xorriso -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-outdev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64-Secure_Boot.iso \
    	-map_l ./ /EFI/BOOT/ BOOTx64.EFI loader.efi HashTool.efi -- \
    	-boot_image any replay \
    	-append_partition 2 0xef eltorito_img2_uefi.img

#### Sign the official ISO with a Machine Owner Key for shim

Support for Secure Boot using shim with a Machine Owner Key (MOK) can be added to the official ISO by extracting the boot loader, kernel and UEFI shell, signing them and then repacking the ISO with the signed files and shim.

First extract the relevant files and El Torito boot images. The boot loader file name will need to be `grubx64.efi` so that shim can find it.

    $ osirrox -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-extract_boot_images ./ \
    	-extract /EFI/BOOT/BOOTx64.EFI grubx64.efi \
    	-extract /shellx64.efi shellx64.efi \
    	-extract /arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux vmlinuz-linux

xorrisofs(1) option `-rational-rock` as used by mkarchiso makes the files on ISO 9660 read-only which persists after extracting them. Make the files writable so that they can be modified:

    $ chmod +w grubx64.efi shellx64.efi vmlinuz-linux

Sign the files with your MOK:

    $ sbsign --key MOK.key --cert MOK.crt --output grubx64.efi grubx64.efi
    $ sbsign --key MOK.key --cert MOK.crt --output shellx64.efi shellx64.efi
    $ sbsign --key MOK.key --cert MOK.crt --output vmlinuz-linux vmlinuz-linux

Acquire pre-signed shim EFI binaries, e.g. by installing shim-signedAUR. Place shim and MokManager in the current directory and change the shim EFI binary's file name to `BOOTx64.EFI`:

    $ cp /usr/share/shim-signed/shimx64.efi BOOTx64.EFI
    $ cp /usr/share/shim-signed/mmx64.efi ./

Copy shim, MokManager, the signed EFI binaries and the DER format MOK to `eltorito_img2_uefi.img`. It will be used as the EFI system partition and will be listed as an El Torito UEFI boot image. The size of `eltorito_img2_uefi.img` is fixed, but there are 8 MiB free space added by mkarchiso (for the purposes of rounding/alignment, to account for reserved sectors, etc.), so the size increase from the added files should not be an issue.

    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img vmlinuz-linux ::/arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux
    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img MOK.cer shellx64.efi ::/
    $ mcopy -D oO -i eltorito_img2_uefi.img BOOTx64.EFI grubx64.efi mmx64.efi ::/EFI/BOOT/

Repack the ISO using the modified El Torito UEFI boot image and add shim, MokManager, the signed EFI binaries and the DER format MOK to ISO 9660:

    $ xorriso -indev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64.iso \
    	-outdev archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64-Secure_Boot.iso \
    	-map vmlinuz-linux /arch/boot/x86_64/vmlinuz-linux \
    	-map_l ./ / shellx64.efi MOK.cer -- \
    	-map_l ./ /EFI/BOOT/ BOOTx64.EFI grubx64.efi mmx64.efi -- \
    	-boot_image any replay \
    	-append_partition 2 0xef eltorito_img2_uefi.img

Boot the resulting `archlinux-YYYY.MM.DD-x86_64-Secure_Boot.iso`. When MokManager launches, select Enroll key from disk > ARCHISO_EFI > MOK.cer. After enrolling the key, reboot and at the next boot, the live environment will successfully boot.

### Enrolling Option ROM digests

Option ROMs (OpROMs), i.e. device firmware that is executed during boot, must be signed for Secure Boot otherwise the devices will not be initialized. Typically OpROMs are signed with the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate which may prevent implementing Secure Boot with only your own keys. To solve this, the SHA256 digests of OpROMs can be enrolled instead.

Warning: Preventing essential devices from initializing by removing the Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate can end up bricking hardware on some machines, including laptops, making it impossible to get into the firmware settings to rectify the situation.

On systems with a TPM, it is possible to acquire Option ROM SHA256 digests from the TPM event log.

Install tpm2-tools and digest-to-efi-sig-listAUR.

Use tpm2_eventlog(1) to read `/sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements` and look for the digests of `BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER`.[8]

For example:

    # tpm2_eventlog /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements

    ...
    - EventNum: 9
      PCRIndex: 2
      EventType: EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER
      DigestCount: 1
      Digests:
      - AlgorithmId: sha256
        Digest: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
    ...
    - EventNum: 10
      PCRIndex: 2
      EventType: EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER
      DigestCount: 1
      Digests:
      - AlgorithmId: sha256
        Digest: "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
    ...

This will print an easy to parse list of digests:

    # tpm2_eventlog /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements | grep -o 'Digest: "[a-f0-9]\{64\}"' | sed 's/Digest: "//;s/"$//'

Use digest-to-efi-sig-listAUR to create an EFI signature list for each OpROM digest you find:

    $ digest-to-efi-sig-list 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef OpROM1.esl
    $ digest-to-efi-sig-list fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210 OpROM2.esl

In case you have multiple OpROMs, combine their EFI signature lists into one so that it could be signed as a single file:

    $ cat OpROM1.esl OpROM2.esl > OpROM.esl

You could use a bash script like this if you have a lot of digests.

Sign the EFI signature list for appending to the Signature Database:

    $ sign-efi-sig-list -a -g "$(< GUID.txt)" -k KEK.key -c KEK.crt db OpROM.esl OpROM.auth

Enroll it.

The final and most dangerous step is to remove Microsoft 3rd Party UEFI CA certificate from the Signature Database and see if the system still boots and all devices still work.

## See also

- Understanding the UEFI Secure Boot Chain by tianocore
- Wikipedia:Unified Extensible Firmware Interface#Secure Boot
- Dealing with Secure Boot by Rod Smith
- Controlling Secure Boot by Rod Smith
- UEFI secure booting (part 2) by Matthew Garrett
- UEFI Secure Boot by James Bottomley
- efitools README
- Will your computer's "Secure Boot" turn out to be "Restricted Boot"? — Free Software Foundation
- Free Software Foundation recommendations for free operating system distributions considering Secure Boot
- Intel's UEFI Secure Boot Tutorial
- Secure Boot, Signed Modules and Signed ELF Binaries
- National Security Agency docs: UEFI Defensive Practices Guidance and unclassified UEFI Secure Boot customization
- sbkeysync & maintaining uefi key databases by Jeremy Kerr
- Secure your boot process: UEFI + Secureboot + EFISTUB + Luks2 + lvm + ArchLinux (2020-07)
- How is hibernation supported, on machines with UEFI Secure Boot? (Security StackExchange)
- Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux by Lennart Poettering (2021-09-23)
- The tool cryptbootAUR simplifies the whole process and is easy to use

Category:

- Boot process

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